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Abstract
Professional experts oﬀer advice with the objective of appearing well informed.
Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and of the realized state
of the world. This situation is modeled as a reputational cheap-talk game in which
the expert receives a signal of continuously varying intensity with ability-dependent
precision about a continuum of states. Despite allowing an arbitrarily rich message
space, at most two messages are sent in equilibrium. The expert can only credibly
transmit the direction but not the intensity of the information possessed. Equilib-
rium advice is then systematically less informative than under truthtelling.
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1. Introduction
Professional advisers are often concerned with their reputation rather than with the deci-
sions made on the basis on their recommendations. Take for example business consultants’
concern for the perceived quality of their services, managers’ interest in promoting their ca-
reers, and politicians’ pursuit of re-election. Though empirical studies have conﬁrmed the
importance of reputation in the ﬁnancial industry, the theory of information transmission
by professional advisers is still in its infancy.1 This paper investigates from a theoretical
point of view how the implicit incentives in the labor market and political system aﬀect
the information revealed by advisers concerned with their reputation.
We model strategic revelation of unveriﬁable information by a professional adviser
seeking to develop a reputation for being well informed.2 Advisers are assumed to have
diﬀerent degrees of expertise, i.e., informativeness of their signal structure. In our model
the expert is assumed to receive a continuous signal of ability-dependent precision about
the state of the world. The expert then reports to an evaluator, in a setting where no proof
can be given to substantiate the recommendation. The state of the world is subsequently
revealed to the evaluator, who combines it with the recommendation to update the belief
regarding the expert’s ability. This belief is referred to as reputation and determines the
expert’s future prospects and payoﬀ.
As noted by Welch (2000), if analysts have a continuous message space it is in principle
possible to invert each analyst’s (supposedly separable) strategy thereby uncovering their
private signals. If analysts release their reports sequentially and incorporate other analysts’
information in their recommendations, the most recently issued report should eﬃciently
aggregate the private information held by all analysts. For this reason, Welch studies
analysts with an exogenously coarse message space (consisting of recommendations like
“sell”, “hold”, and “buy”) in order to obtain herding along the lines of Banerjee (1992)
1See the following recent empirical papers: Lamont (2002) on macroeconomic forecasters, Ehrbeck and
Waldmann (1996) on three-month U.S. Treasury bills interest rate forecasters, Graham (1999), Hong,
Kubik and Solomon (1999), Welch (2000), and Zitzewitz (2001a) on security analysts, and Chevalier and
Ellison (1999) on mutual fund managers.
2See Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), and Morris (2001) for models of reputation building
about preferences rather than quality of information possessed.
1and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). This paper shows that in reputational
cheap talk equilibrium the message space is endogenously coarse.
Contrary to naive intuition, experts wishing to be perceived as accurate will not truth-
fully reveal their private information. Suppose that the evaluator presumes a fully sep-
arating strategy whereby the expert’s signal can be inferred from the message reported.
We prove that the signal bringing the highest reputational payoﬀ is only rarely the one
privately possessed by the expert. Generically the expert will wish to lie, claiming to pos-
sess the most advantageous signal. In the special case in which the signal alone conveys
no information about the expert’s ability, the expert has an incentive to bias the report
towards the prior belief. Intuitively, the expert wants to give the impression of having a
more informative signal than she does. Hence, truthtelling cannot be sustained in equilib-
rium. An expert who desires to impress a rational audience is unable to communicate all
the information possessed. As a result professional advice cannot be taken at face value.
Because part of the information possessed by experts cannot be credibly conveyed to the
receivers, there is a welfare loss to society.
The model features cheap talk: the expert (sender) cares about the receiver’s response
(i.e., the evaluation of ability), but does not bear a direct cost from the message sent.
Our ﬁnding that equilibrium communication by a professional adviser is necessarily coarse
is reminiscent of Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) result in the canonical model of partisan
advice.3 In our setting this result holds for “well behaved” information structures, as
explained in Section 3. When senders with diﬀerent information rank diﬀerently the re-
ceiver’s evaluation of ability following the various messages sent, it is possible for some
information to be communicated in equilibrium. For this to be the case, it is necessary
that the evaluator receives ex post some additional information about the state.4
The endogenous coarseness of equilibrium communication is the starting point of our
analysis. In order to characterize the structure of equilibria, we focus on the natural
case of an expert who receives a signal of continuously varying intensity with ability-
dependent precision about a continuum of states. With this special signal structure the
most informative equilibrium is either binary or completely uninformative. In either case,
a reported message pools many signals, and is therefore less precise than the sender’s
3In the cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) a privately informed sender is interested in in-
ﬂuencing the decision taken by a receiver. In contrast with the case of delegation considered by Holmstr¨ om
(1977), in cheap talk the receiver cannot commit to take any decision other than the ex-post optimal one
given the information communicated by the sender. Crawford and Sobel ﬁnd that some communication
is possible when the sender and the decision maker have suﬃciently congruent preferences.
4While in Crawford and Sobel’s model the sender is always better informed than the receiver, in our
setting the evaluator observes an additional signal (the realization of the state) before taking the action
(evaluation of the sender).
2true signal. Roughly speaking, the sender can at best communicate the direction of her
information but cannot accurately convey its intensity. The report not only garbles the
information about the state of the world, but also about the expert’s true ability.
Bayarri and DeGroot (1988) and (1989) were the ﬁrst to analyze an expert’s incentive
to manipulate the information reported in order to gain inﬂuence. They posited that the
weight given to an expert is proportional to an expert’s prior weight and the predictive
density that the expert had assigned to the outcome that turns out to be actually ob-
served.5 In their setting, experts who maximize their own weight by optimally choosing
the predictive distribution to report, typically do not want to honestly report their pos-
terior belief. Our model departs from the Bayesian statistics literature in two important
ways. Firstly, rather than assuming an ad hoc updating rule for the weights, we follow the
lead of Holmstr¨ om (1982/1999) by positing optimal updating on the quality of the expert’s
information.6 The evaluator (or “market”) is essentially a statistician and makes optimal
use of all information available to form the posterior belief on the informativeness of the
expert’s signal. The second innovation with respect to the Bayesian statistics literature
is that we not only characterize the incentives to deviate from honest reporting in our
setting, but we also study the equilibrium of the game.
In their pioneering paper, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) analyzed the equilibrium of
a two-period version of a reputational cheap talk model with a diﬀerent sender in each
period.7 For simplicity they considered a model in which signals, states, and ability types
are all binary. With two signals there is a perfectly informative equilibrium whenever an
informative equilibrium exists (Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000)), so there is no manifestation
of coarseness. While Scharfstein and Stein (1990) ﬁxed the prior on the state such that
there exists an informative equilibrium in the ﬁrst period, in our continuous version of the
static one-agent model we treat the prior on the state parametrically. In our more general
formulation of the static model we can ﬁnd conditions for coarseness and other qualitative
properties of the equilibrium which could not be detected in their binary signal model.
The theory of reputational cheap talk can be applied to a number of social situations.
5This happens naturally if a linear opinion pool is used (e.g., see Genest and Zidek (1986)).
6Section III of Holmstr¨ om (1982/1999) contains the ﬁrst formulation of a reputational model where
more able managers have access to a more precise signal about an investment opportunity. Holmstr¨ om
uses an example to illustrate that managers might refrain from investment in order to shield themselves
from the risk associated with learning about ability that would otherwise result. For a general analysis
of the moral hazard problem presented instead in the ﬁrst part of Holmstr¨ om’s paper see Dewatripont,
Jewitt and Tirole (1999).
7Departing from Holmstr¨ om (1982/1999), they assumed that the state of the world is eventually realized
regardless of the report. We also assume that the sender’s report does not aﬀect the state or what the
receiver can observe about it.
3Consider a politician who derives private beneﬁts from being reappointed by an electorate
assessing her competence. If those politicians who are considered to be better informed
are more likely to be re-elected, they are subject to the same incentives as our professional
advisers.8 Likewise, the reputational objective is natural when modeling conversation
among people who share preferences about alternatives or who have a negligible eﬀect on
the ﬁnal decision to be taken.9 In a companion paper, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001b)
apply the theory of reputational cheap talk to the problem of strategic forecasting and
compare its predictions to those of alternative theories.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 addresses
whether the revelation of information can be truthful. Section 4 characterizes the optimal
deviation from truthtelling. Section 5 analyzes the reputational cheap talk equilibrium,
discusses some important implications for herding that can be obtained in dynamic ex-
tensions of the model, and derives some comparative statics predictions. Section 6 brieﬂy
discusses the empirical predictions of this model. Section 7 performs some robustness
checks and contains extensions useful for applied and empirical research. In particular,
we allow the expert to also have private information about her own type, to be directly
concerned about the accuracy of the decision made, and to compete directly with other
experts. Section 8 concludes with a summary of the contributions of the paper. All proofs
are collected in the Appendix.
2. Model
An expert of ability (or talent) type t ∈ T ⊆ R privately receives an informative signal
s ∈ S on the state of the world x ∈ X with conditional probability density function (p.d.f.)
f(s|x,t). Assume x and t are statistically independent, with common non-degenerate prior
beliefs q (x) on state and p(t) on ability. In order to keep the expert’s private information
uni-dimensional, we assume until Section 7.3 that the sender does not know her own ability
type t. After observation of the non-provable signal, the expert (or sender) decides which
message m ∈ M to send. The message space is arbitrarily rich. A strategy of the sender is
8See Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) for a characterization of the bias induced by re-election concerns
on the decisions made by politicians in a model in which ability adds instead to the value of the project
undertaken. Heidhues and Lagerl¨ of (2001) analyze political competition when the electorate rewards the
politician who is most likely to have committed to the right decision.
9Before making a decision, individuals exchange information by speaking to one another. For example,
committee members typically select the relevant alternatives via open discussion. Conversation often takes
place among people who are interested in developing their reputation of being well informed. After all,
those with better reputation are more likely to gain inﬂuence in future decisions. See Ottaviani and Sø
rensen (2001a) for a model of political debate among heterogenous experts motivated by their reputation
as good experts.
4The reputational payoﬀ of message m in state x is
W(m|x) ≡
Z
T
v(t)p(t|m,x)dt, (2.1)
so that the expected reputational payoﬀ for a sender with signal s who sends message m
is
V (m|s) =
Z
X
W(m|x)q(x|s)dx, (2.2)
where the expert’s posterior belief on the state x conditional on receiving signal s is
given by Bayes’ rule as q (x|s) = f(s|x)q(x)/f (s), with f (s|x) =
R
T f(s|x,t)p(t) dt and
f (s) =
R
X f(s|x)q (x) dx.
Regardless of the privately observed signal, the expert wishes to induce the evaluator’s
most favorable beliefs. The preference ordering over reputation for expertise is therefore
common across types. As ﬁrst noticed by Seidmann (1990) in cheap-talk games with
inter-type agreement, information can nevertheless be transmitted in equilibrium provided
that the receiver’s decision is based on some additional information. In our setting, the
evaluator observes the state, not known to the sender when the message is sent. Messages
sent correspond to lotteries over posterior reputations, which depend on the realization
of the state. Depending on the evaluator’s rule for calculating the posterior reputation,
diﬀerent messages may induce lotteries that are diﬀerently appealing to diﬀerent types of
experts.
3. Conditions for Truthtelling
By deﬁnition, truthful information transmission occurs when M = S and the message sent
equals the signal received, so that µ(s|s) = 1. Assume for the moment that the receiver
naively believes that the sender is applying this truthful strategy, so that ˆ f (m|x,t) =
f (m|x,t). Is truthtelling then the optimal strategy for the sender? Whenever the answer
is aﬃrmative, truthtelling is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the cheap-talk game.
We ﬁnd below that truthtelling is an equilibrium in the standard model of the classical
statistician performing a symmetric location experiment. But we quickly note that this
ﬁnding is not robust in a Bayesian setting, as generic choices of the prior belief q (x) and
value function v (t) render equilibrium truthtelling impossible.
3.1. Symmetric Location Experiments
We ﬁrst show that truthtelling results in a completely symmetric location experiment
with essentially no prior information. In order to have a proper uniform prior, the space
6X should be compact — we will comment later on the important case where the prior
is the improper uniform on the real line. Further, it would be inconvenient to make our
symmetry assumptions below on a bounded subset of the real line. Assume then that
the spaces X and S are both the unit circle, corresponding to the circumference of the
unit ball in R2. A real number z indicates a point on the circle in the usual way, giving
the anti-clockwise distance along the circumference from (1,0), the circle’s origin in the
plane.13 To build a location experiment, let there be given p.d.f.s g (s|t) over the unit
circle, indexed by t ∈ T ⊆ R, with these three properties:
(i) Symmetry: s is distributed on the circle symmetrically around 0, i.e. g (s|t) =
g (−s|t) for all s ∈ [0,π].
(ii) Unimodality: s is distributed unimodally around 0, i.e. g (s|t) is a decreasing
function of s ∈ [0,π].
(iii) Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP): g (s|t)/g (s|t0) is strictly decreasing
in s ∈ [0,π] when t0 < t, so that an s closer to 0 is better news for t.
The location experiment then has conditional p.d.f. given by f (s|x,t) = g (s − x|t).
It is simple to see that f inherits the symmetry and unimodality properties (around x)
such that f (x + s|x,t) = f (x − s|s,t) for all s ∈ [0,π] and f (x + s|x,t) is decreasing in
s ∈ [0,π]. Clearly, f (s|x) = g (s − x) =
R
T g(s−x|t)p(t) dt inherits these same properties
for any prior p(t).
Proposition 1 (Truthtelling in Location Experiment). Consider a location experi-
ment f (s|x,t) = g (s − x|t) with g satisfying symmetry, unimodality and MLRP. If the
prior q (x) is the uniform distribution, there is a truthtelling equilibrium for arbitrary prior
reputation p(t) and increasing value function v (t).
This result crucially depends on the uniform prior on the state q (x).14 Truthfully
reporting m = s is then equivalent to reporting the mode of the symmetric posterior
distribution q (x|s). Since a signal s closer to the state x indicates a higher ability t by the
MLRP and the state is concentrated around s, it is advantageous for the sender to send
m = s when the receiver interprets m as s. Truthtelling would instead be incompatible
13For instance, the numbers −2π,0,2π all indicate the origin, while π/2 indicates the point (0,1) of the
plane.
14Notice that Proposition 1 applies to more signal structures than those on the unit circle presented
there. Assume that ϕ is a one-to-one mapping of X = S into some other space X0 = S0. Using ϕ we can
transform q (x) into a distribution on X0, transform g(s|t) into a distribution on S0, and construct f as
before. Then we ﬁnd a new value function V 0 (ϕ(m)|ϕ(s)) = V (m|s) and it is clear that the analysis
carries over. For instance, with ϕ we could cut the circle open and straighten it out to an interval. The
resulting family of signal distributions is no longer a proper location family, since it is wrapped at the
ends of the interval, but it has X,S ⊆ R.
7with equilibrium for any location experiment with a proper prior belief on the state. To see
this, consider the well-known normal location experiment with s|x ∼ N (x,1/τ) used by
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001b) to develop the theory of strategic behavior of professional
forecasters. Unless the prior on the state is the improper uniform distribution on the
real line, the report that guarantees the highest expected reputational payoﬀ to the expert
against the receiver’s naive beliefs is not the best predictor of the state E [x|s]. For instance
with normal prior on the state x ∼ N (µ,1/ν), under some additional assumptions it can
be shown that the best deviation is equal to E [x|s0 = E [x|s]], because a signal equal to
the posterior mean is the one most likely to be observed by a well-informed expert. Since
the posterior mean E [x|s] is between the signal and the prior mean, an expert who is
presumed honest by the market proﬁtably deviates toward the prior mean.
To shed further light on Proposition 1, we now argue that truthtelling likewise results
when a signal indicates that a state is inﬁnitely more likely than all the other ones. This
happens for instance when the state has an atomless distribution q(x) and the signal a
dichotomous distribution, whereby the expert receives perfect information (s = x) with
probability t, and otherwise receives an uninformative draw from an atomless distribution
h(s). Formally, let δx(s) be the Dirac delta function, and assume that X ⊆ S. The signal
is drawn from
f(s|x,t) = tδx(s) + (1 − t)h(s). (3.1)
Receiving signal s, the posterior on the state has an atom at x = s and a continuous density
over all other x’s. Moreover, the evaluator that receives m = x concludes that the signal
was derived from the perfectly informative distribution rather than the uninformative one,
and that this is good news about the type. Conversely, m 6= x is bad news. Thus, truthful
reporting of the signal m(s) = s constitutes an equilibrium, since any other signal would
have probability zero to turn out to be correct. Formally:
Proposition 2 (Truthtelling in Dichotomous Experiment). Truthtelling is an equi-
librium in the dichotomous model with h(s) and q(x) atomless.
3.2. Generic Impossibility of Truthtelling
We now show that truthtelling can only result in degenerate situations, as also indepen-
dently observed by Campbell (1998) in a more special case. Assume that S,X are closed
subsets of R, and that S is convex (i.e., an interval). Assume that f(s|x,t) is bounded
and continuously diﬀerentiable in s, with f and fs jointly continuous in (x,t).
We say that local truthtelling is possible at the signal ˆ s ∈ S if there exists an open inter-
val I ⊂ S containing ˆ s, such that when the receiver anticipates truthtelling ( ˆ f (m|x,t) =
8f (m|x,t) for all m ∈ I) then V (s|s) = maxm∈I V (m|s) for all s ∈ I. In words, there
is a whole interval around ˆ s where truthtelling by the sender is an optimal response to
the receiver’s anticipation of this. Local truthtelling immediately implies the ﬁrst order
condition
Vm (s|s) = 0 (3.2)
for all s ∈ I. The thrust of our argument is to show that this identity cannot hold on an
interval, unless if the model is degenerate.
A signal structure is deﬁned to be locally uninformative about talent at ˆ s ∈ S if there
exists an open interval I ⊂ S containing ˆ s and functions K (t) and κ(s|x) such that
f (s|x,t) = K (t)κ(s|x) for all s ∈ I and almost all x ∈ X and almost all t ∈ T. This
states that the conditional p.d.f. is separable in the (partly) observable outcome (s,x) and
the unobservable talent t about which inference is made. The condition implies that the
evaluator cannot use the pair (s,x) to make any discriminatory inference on t. Namely,
for any two pairs (s,x) and (s0,x0) we ﬁnd p(t|s,x) = p(t|s0,x0).15
Local truthtelling is possible at ˆ s when there is local uninformativeness at ˆ s, since the
posterior reputation is entirely independent of the message sent. This complete indiﬀerence
trivially results in truthtelling. The crux of the model is that the sender aﬀects the posterior
reputation p(t|m,x) through the message m depending on the realization of the state x.
The assumption of global uninformativeness needed to obtain global truthtelling is then
unduly restrictive. Unless the signal is globally uninformative, there is scope for strategic
manipulation of the posterior belief.
Theorem 1 (No Truthtelling). Assume that S,X are closed subsets of R, and that S is
convex (i.e. an interval). Assume that f(s|x,t) is bounded and continuously diﬀerentiable
in s, with f and fs jointly continuous in (x,t). If the signal structure is not locally
uninformative about talent at ˆ s ∈ S, local truthtelling at ˆ s is impossible for an open and
dense set of prior beliefs q (x) and value functions v (t).
If the signal is not locally uninformative, diﬀerent message and state pairs (m,x) imply
diﬀerent posterior reputations. The sender is uncertain about the location of x, and
through perturbations in the prior q (x) we perturb the lotteries over reputations resulting
from the available messages. Perturbations in v (t) guarantee that this translates into a
relative diﬀerentiation of the expected reputational value.
15Here the posterior reputation was stated under the assumption of truthful reporting. But it is easily
veriﬁed that it holds for more general strategies. For any two messages m and m0 which are sent only for
signals in the interval I, and for any two states x and x0, we have p(t|m,x) = p(t|m0,x).
9The truthtelling condition (3.2) also suggests how to use explicit monetary incen-
tives to reinstate truthtelling. If the message sent were veriﬁable and explicit incentives
were allowed, truthtelling could be obtained by oﬀering the reward schedule R(m) =
R m
−∞ Vm (˜ m|˜ m) d˜ m to the expert. Correspondingly, the ex-ante cost of implementing
truthtelling would be
R
S R(s)f (s) ds. Notice that the cost could be lower if the reward
were allowed to depend also on the realization of the state. For the rest of this paper we
exclude the possibility of monetary incentives.
4. Optimal Deviation in Linear Model
For the remainder of this paper we posit that the distribution of the signal conditional on
the state x and ability t is linear in t ∈ [0,1],
f(s|x,t) = tg(s|x) + (1 − t)h(s), (4.1)
being a mixture between an informative and an uninformative experiment.16 Better experts
are more likely to receive a signal drawn from the informative g(s|x) rather than the
uninformative h(s). In fact, a more talented expert receives better information in the
sense of Blackwell. To see this, consider the garbling of s into e s whereby e s = s with
probability τ < 1, and otherwise e s is independently redrawn from h(s). Then
e f(e s|x,t) = τf(e s|x,t) + (1 − τ)h(e s) = f(e s|x,τt),
so that the garbled signal to an expert of ability t > 0 is distributed as the ungarbled
signal to an expert of ability τt < t.
The linearity of f(s|x,t) in t greatly simpliﬁes considerations involving the expert’s pay-
oﬀ. A strategy of the sender is a mapping from signals to messages, with µ(m|s) denoting
the conditional chance that m is sent when s is the signal. When the receiver conjectures
the strategy ˆ µ, he can compute ˆ g(m|x) =
R
S ˆ µ(m|s)g(s|x) ds and ˆ h(m) =
R
S ˆ µ(m|s)h(s) ds.
Then ˆ f(m|x,t) = tˆ g(m|x) + (1 − t)ˆ h(m) and ˆ f(m|x) =
R
T
ˆ f(m|x,t)p(t)dt. Bayesian up-
dating gives the posterior belief on ability p(t|m,x) = ˆ f(m|x,t)p(t)/ ˆ f(m|x). Substitution
16This linear model is well suited to study problems in information economics. While the similarity
with Hart and Holmstr¨ om’s (1987) linear distribution function condition is only superﬁcial, the connec-
tion with Green and Stokey’s (1980) success-enhancing model is deep rooted. In the success-enhancing
model the experiment fails with positive probability, in which case the signal is uninformative about the
state. Similarly, in the linear model, the signal comes from an uninformative experiment with positive
probability. The main diﬀerence is that in the success-enhancing model the experimenter observes whether
the experiment failed or not, while in the linear model the experimenter only knows the probability that
the experiment is contaminated.
10in (2.2) gives
V (m|s) =
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)
tˆ g(m|x) + (1 − t)ˆ h(m)
E[t]ˆ g(m|x) + (1 − E[t])ˆ h(m)
p(t)dtq(x|s)dx
= E[v(t)] + (E[tv(t)] − E[t]E[v(t)])
Z
X
ˆ g(m|x) − ˆ h(m)
ˆ f(m|x)
q(x|s)dx,
which depends on p(t) only through Et. Notice that E[tv(t)]−E [t]E[v(t)] > 0 when v is
strictly increasing and t does not have a degenerate prior distribution. In the linear model
the expert’s behavior is therefore independent of properties of the value function v(t) other
than that it is strictly increasing. The reason is that in model (4.1), posterior reputations
p(t|x,m) are unambiguously ranked (in the ﬁrst-order stochastic sense) depending on the
pair (x,m).
Lemma 1. It is without loss of generality to let the expert have payoﬀ
V (m|s) =
Z
X
ˆ g(m|x) − ˆ h(m)
ˆ f(m|x)
q(x|s)dx, (4.2)
a positive aﬃne transformation of the original (2.2).
With ˆ f(m|x,t) = tˆ g(m|x) + (1 − t)ˆ h(m), the higher ˆ g(m|x) is relatively to ˆ h(m), the
higher is the expert’s reputation, for this corresponds to higher weight on the t term and
lower weight on the 1 − t term. The result that W(m|x) =
￿
ˆ g(m|x) − ˆ h(m)
￿
/ ˆ f(m|x)
clearly reﬂects this.
In the following we assume that S,X are subsets of R. Assume that both g(s|x)
and h(s) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and that g satisﬁes the MLRP in (s,x).
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a linear signal structure to satisfy the MLRP in
(s,x) for all t is gsxh > gxhs. This follows from the observation fsxf − fsfx = t2(gsxg −
gsgx) + t(1 − t)(gsxh − gxhs). This MLRP assumption, satisﬁed by model (5.1) below, is
maintained throughout the paper.
A particular signal realization ˜ s is neutral about the state, if g(˜ s|x) is constant in x.
An expert who receives a neutral signal has posterior beliefs q (x|˜ s) = q (x): the signal is
not informative about x since f(˜ s|x,t) is independent of x.
Let us now revisit the impossibility of truthtelling within the linear model. In response
to naive beliefs, the ideal signal an expert wishes to send is diﬀerent from the one observed.
With a few restrictions on the model, we can predict that the direction of the deviation is
towards the neutral signal:17
17For a similar but independently derived result see Campbell’s (1998) Proposition 3.1.
11Proposition 3 (Best Deviation). Assume gsx > 0 and that signal ˜ s is neutral. Assume
that any signal is uninformative about ability (p(t|s) = p(t) for all s). The best deviation
against naive beliefs is to report a signal s0 strictly in between the neutral signal ˜ s and the
signal actually possessed s.
This result requires stronger assumptions on the signal structure than Theorem 1,
but is valid for all increasing value functions v. Its logic relies on the following three
observations. First, higher realizations of the state x are better news about ability when
signal s0 such that s0 > ˜ s is understood to have been reported. Second, the sender with
s such that s > s0 believes more in higher realizations of x the sender with s0. Third,
the sender who reports truthfully is expecting the same value Ev regardless of the signal
actually observed. Therefore, the sender with s has a higher expected reputational payoﬀ
from reporting s0 ∈ (˜ s,s) compared to that of the sender with signal s0, itself equal to the
truthtelling value Ev.18
5. Equilibrium in Multiplicative Linear Model
In order to characterize the equilibrium we impose from now on further restrictions on the
signal distribution. We adopt the multiplicative linear model: the signal conditionally on
the state x ∈ X = [−1,1] and ability type t ∈ T = [0,1] is distributed according to the
density
f(s|x,t) = t
1 + sx
2
+ (1 − t)
1
2
=
1
2
(1 + stx), (5.1)
with s ∈ S = [−1,1], as illustrated in Figure 2.
This signal structure satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) in s,x
for any value of t > 0: The likelihood ratio f(s|x,t)/f(s|x0,t) is increasing in s for x > x0.
Clearly, also f(s|x) =
R
T f(s|x,t)p(t) dt = f(s|x,Et) satisﬁes the MLRP. Notice also that
this signal structure is boundedly informative about the state (the only exception to this
being for t = 1, when the most extreme signals s = ±1 rule out the most extreme states x =
18Although driven by diﬀerent forces, this result is reminiscent of the “yes-men” eﬀect analyzed by
Prendergast (1993). He considers an agent who has access to two private signals, one on the state of the
world and the other on the principal’s private signal on the state. In order to induce the agent to gather
and report information, the principal commits to a reward scheme based on the diﬀerence between the
agent’s report and the principal’s signal. This commitment results in the agent honestly reporting her
best estimate of the principal’s private signal. But since the agent’s report contains information from her
two sources, the principal can extract only imperfectly the agent’s direct signal about the state. While
in Prendergast’s model the agent does not suﬃciently move away from the principal’s opinion, in our
model the agent does not move away from the neutral signal. In both models, information transmission is
therefore ineﬃcient. (Ewerhart and Schmitz (2000) have shown that if instead the agent in Prendergast’s
model is also asked to report her private information, eﬃciency is restored).
12∓1 respectively). This model satisﬁes two other important properties: First, signal s = 0
is neutral with respect to both state (q (x|s = 0) = q (x)) and ability (p(t|s = 0) = p(t)).
Second, when the prior on the state has zero mean Ex = 0, any signal is uninformative
about ability, i.e. p(t|s) = p(t).19
s
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Figure 2: Graphs of the conditional densities f (s|x,t) = (1 + stx)/2 for
ﬁxed t = 1/2 and three values of x = −1,0,1. The downward sloping
line corresponds to the case with x = −1, the ﬂat one to x = 0, and the
increasing one to x = 1. Intermediate values of x would give intermediate
lines. Each line (other than the one corresponding to x = 0) becomes
steeper as t increases.
Notice that the widely used symmetric binary model has the same generalized p.d.f.
(5.1), with S = X = {−1,1} and T =
￿
t,t
￿
, where 0 ≤ t < t ≤ 1 (see e.g. Scharfstein
and Stein (1990)). It is useful to think of a signal satisfying (5.1) as being binary, but of
a continuously varying intensity level. The multiplicative linear model is then a natural
generalization of the binary-signal model to allow for a continuum of states, signals, and
ability types in a tractable way and might be useful in other problems in information eco-
nomics.20 By re-normalizing the support of S and X to the unit interval, it is immediately
seen that this is the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern distribution with uniform marginals (cf.
Conway (1983)).
With this additional restriction we can derive strong characterization results. There
can be only partition equilibria with endogenously coarse communication (Section 5.1), the
only informative equilibria are binary and there is no informative equilibrium at all when
19This assumption was made by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and is maintained in Campbell (1998).
In this case the sender does not learn anything about own ability by observing the signal, so that the
message sent cannot signal any such knowledge. This assumption amounts to a degenerate restriction on
the set of prior beliefs on the state.
20Special versions of this model have been extensively used in economics. See e.g. Lohmann’s (1994)
generalization of the binary model and Piccione and Tan’s (1996, page 504) example of a signal structure
with an uninformative signal.
13the prior belief on the state is suﬃciently concentrated (Section 5.2). After presenting an
extended example with binary state (Section 5.3), we brieﬂy discuss issues arising when
extending the model to allow for sequential advice by diﬀerent experts (Section 5.4) and
derive some comparative statics results (Section 5.5).
5.1. Interval Equilibria
The multiplicative linear model (5.1) satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 1 for generic
impossibility of truthtelling and Proposition 3 for the best deviation provided that Ex =
0. In the multiplicative linear model we have ˆ f(m|x,t) = (1 + E[s|m]tx) ˆ µ(m)/2, where
ˆ µ(m) =
R
S ˆ µ(m|s)ds, and E[s|m] =
R
S sˆ µ(m|s)ds/ˆ µ(m), so that
W(m|x) =
ˆ g(m|x) − ˆ h(m)
ˆ f(m|x)
=
E[s|m]x
1 + E[s|m]xEt
. (5.2)
We can then derive the following stronger result:
Proposition 4 (Absolutely No Truthtelling). Local truthtelling at any s ∈ [−1,1] is
impossible for all non-degenerate priors q (x),p(t) and strictly increasing value functions
v (t).
Having ruled out perfectly separating equilibria, we now show that equilibria have a
partition structure whereby connected sets of signals are pooled. Notice that the following
sorting condition holds:
∂2W(m|x)
∂E[s|m]∂x
=
1 − E[s|m]xEt
(1 + E[s|m]xEt)
2 > 0. (5.3)
Messages corresponding to signals with higher mean give higher payoﬀ the higher the state
of the world.
Consider two possible messages, m and m0 where m0 is higher than m in the sense that
E[s|m0] > E[s|m]. Then (5.3) implies that the higher message yields a payoﬀ increasing in
x. Since experts with higher signals believe in higher states, we can establish the following
monotonicity property:
Proposition 5 (Monotonicity). V (m0|s) − V (m|s) increases in s if E[s|m0] > E[s|m].
Incentive compatibility implies that if two messages have E[s|m0] > E[s|m], all expert
types sending message m0 have higher signals than those sending m. This implies that
each message m sent in equilibrium corresponds to signals that belong to some interval
subset of S. By Proposition 1 we know that there cannot be truthful reporting in any
subinterval of S. Hence, the typical message interval has a non-empty interior, although
there may be occasional isolated one-point intervals:
14Proposition 6 (Partitions). All perfect Bayesian equilibria have interval messages.21
As is typical in cheap-talk games, a completely uninformative (pooling or babbling)
equilibrium always exists. If the evaluator expects all messages to be uninformative, the
senders have no choice but to pool on the relevant messages. Rather than discussing
equilibrium selection, we characterize the set of all perfect Bayesian equilibria.
5.2. Binary Equilibria
The partition structure of the equilibria in our professional model is similar to one found by
Crawford and Sobel in the partisan setting, but it is driven by diﬀerent forces. Diﬀerently
from their setting, there is no natural notion of closeness between a professional adviser’s
objective and the receiver’s evaluation objective. We ﬁnd in the multiplicative linear model
all equilibria are binary: only two messages are sent, one for s ≥ a and the other for s < a,
where a ∈ (−1,1). The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that more than two
messages were sent in equilibrium. By continuity, an expert with a signal at the border
between two adjacent messages must be indiﬀerent between them. The contradiction
follows from the fact that the two indiﬀerence conditions at the extremes of an intermediate
message are incompatible.
Proposition 7 (Partition Size). In the multiplicative linear model all informative equi-
libria are binary.
This result is striking, but it is quite special to the multiplicative linear model (5.1).22
We now provide a simple example of an equilibrium with more than two messages in
a statistical model belonging to the linear class (4.1). Let X = {−1,1}, S = [−1,1],
g (s|x) = (1 + sx)/2, and h(s) = γ + δs2. Clearly, γ = 1/2 − δ/3 in order for h(s) to be
a density. Furthermore, γ > δ for the MLRP to be satisﬁed, so that we need δ < 3/8.
Set for example γ = 5/12, δ = 1/4, Et = 1/2, and Pr(x = 1) = Pr(x = −1) = 1/2, and
look for a symmetric equilibrium with three messages. It is easy to check numerically that
the three messages {[−1,−a],[−a,a],[a,1]} with a ≈ .80218 constitute an equilibrium.
21It is technically possible to construct non-interval equilibria where two messages m and m0 sent in
equilibrium have E[s|m] = E[s|m0]. In that case the two corresponding messages, m and m0 convey equal
information about x,t. Indeed, f(m|t,x) = f(m0|t,x) = (1 + E[s|m]tx)/2 for all t,x. Thus the two
messages might as well be pooled into one message, and we restrict attention to the interval equilibria.
22In the context of the normal learning model, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001b) have shown that there is
always a binary equilibrium, but have not been able to prove that there are no equilibria with more than
two partitions. This is because the cumulative distribution of the normal distribution is not analytically
tractable. This problem is clearly overcome by the multiplicative linear model introduced in this paper.
15Notice that this model does not have the uninformativeness property, i.e. it is not possible
to have a prior on the state such that any signal is uninformative about ability.
Returning to our multiplicative linear model (5.1), we now characterize the binary
equilibria. Let m denote the message sent for s ∈ [−1,a] and m0 the message sent for
s ∈ (a,1], with −1 < a < 1. The indiﬀerence condition V (m|a) = V (m0|a) is
Z
X
x(1 + axEt)
[2 + (a − 1)xEt][2 + (a + 1)xEt]
q(x)dx = 0. (5.4)
If and only if a ∈ (−1,1) solves this equation, messages [−1,a] and (a,1] constitute a
binary equilibrium.
We now identify a prominent instance in which a binary equilibrium exists. We ask,
when is there a symmetric equilibrium with a = 0? Inserting in (5.4) we ﬁnd
Z
X
x
(2 − xEt)(2 + xEt)
q(x)dx = 0.
As the function x/[4 − x2(Et)2] is anti-symmetric around x = 0, we conclude that the
symmetric equilibrium exists when the distribution of x is symmetric around 0.
Proposition 8 (Existence of Binary Equilibrium). When the prior on x is symmet-
ric around 0, there is a symmetric binary equilibrium with messages [−1,0] and (0,1].
The intuition is straightforward. The sender learns nothing about the state when
receiving the neutral signal s = 0, so that with the symmetric prior (and posterior) on the
state it looks equally attractive to send either the high or the low message.
Notice that at the ends of the interval, a = −1 and a = 1, the left-hand side of (5.4)
is equal to Ex/4. The integral varies continuously with a, showing that the number of
binary equilibria must be even. Thus, when informative equilibria exist, generically in
the prior on state, there are multiple such equilibria. To better understand this multi-
plicity, consider the equilibrium condition, V ((a,1]|a) − V ([−1,a]|a) = 0. On the one
hand, V ((a,1]|s) − V ([−1,a]|s) is increasing in s for any a, i.e. holding ﬁxed the re-
ceiver’s beliefs the sender with higher signal likes better the high message (Proposition
5). On the other hand, V ((a,1]|s) − V ([−1,a]|s) is decreasing in a for any s, i.e. holding
ﬁxed the sender’s signal the higher message becomes less appealing when the receiver’s
beliefs move up. The balance between these two opposed eﬀects determines whether
V ([a,1]|a)−V ([−1,a]|a) is increasing or decreasing in a. Multiplicity of equilibria results
from the fact that V ([a,1]|a) − V ([−1,a]|a) is equal to 0 for several values of a.
Finally, assume that the prior is highly concentrated near some x > 0. Any signal
s is of bounded informativeness about states of the world, so the posterior q(x|s) is still
16concentrated around x. Whenever the state turns out positive, it is favorable to the
expert’s reputation to report a message with E[s|m] > 0. If it were possible to send a
message with E[s|m] > 0, the expert would want to send this message, regardless of the
signal s actually received. This cannot hold in equilibrium, since E[s|m] = 0 when all
signals are pooled into one message:
Proposition 9 (No Informative Equilibrium). If the prior distribution on the state
is concentrated suﬃciently close to any x 6= 0, there exists no informative equilibrium.
Intuitively, when the prior is concentrated enough there cannot be any informative
equilibrium, because all experts wish to bias their signal in one direction.23 Note that
this result does not hold for x = 0, since Proposition 8 guarantees the existence of an
informative equilibrium for any (symmetric) prior arbitrarily concentrated on 0. Yet, even
in that case the messages convey very little information about ability.
The most informative equilibrium is either binary or even completely uninformative.
Since reported messages pool many signals, they are far less precise than the sender’s true
signal. The sender can communicate at most the direction of her information but cannot
convey its intensity. There is pooling on the intensity dimension, since experts would
always want to pretend to have more precise information. Rationality of the evaluator
makes this incentive self defeating.
5.3. Binary State Example
We now oﬀer a pictorial depiction of the equilibria in a simple example. Assume that the
prior distribution of x is concentrated on −1 and +1, with q being the prior probability
of state +1. Now (5.4) can be re-written as
q
1 − q
=
1 − aEt
1 + aEt
2 + (a − 1)Et
2 − (a − 1)Et
2 + (a + 1)Et
2 − (a + 1)Et
, (5.5)
a third-order polynomial equation in a. Denote the right hand side of (5.5) by ρ(a,Et),
plotted in Figure 3 for Et = 1/2. For q = 1/2 the equation has one solution in (−1,1), so
that a = 0 is an equilibrium. The equation has two solutions in (−1,1) when q ∈ (1 − ¯ q, ¯ q)
with ¯ q > 1/2, one solution when q is equal to 1 − ¯ q and ¯ q, and no solution in (−1,1)
whenever q > ¯ q and q < 1 − ¯ q. As illustrated in the ﬁgure, for the special case Et = 1/2
we have ¯ q = 1
2 +
￿
4−
√
11
60
￿q￿
7 − 2
√
11
￿
= .5069. It is easy to show that there can be no
solution to (5.5) for q < 1/3 or q > 2/3, no matter how good is the prior reputation Et.
No expert can speak credibly for these prior beliefs.
23As shown in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001b), the result does not hold in the normal learning model,
in which signals are unboundedly informative about the state.
17ρ(a,1/2)
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Figure 3: Graph of the right hand side of (5.5) when Et = 1/2.
5.4. Dynamic Extensions and Herding
Proposition 9 is an important building block in a model of herding. Experts who give
advice in sequence, learn about the state of the world by listening to each others’ recom-
mendations. As more experts speak informatively, by the law of large numbers the beliefs
of later experts become ever more concentrated on the true state x. According to Propo-
sition 9, if the belief becomes suﬃciently concentrated in ﬁnite time, experts cannot be
informative any longer and learning stops. This is the logic of statistical herding (Baner-
jee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)) applied to this reputational
model.24 As shown by Smith and Sørensen (2000), with continuous signals the belief may
not reach the herding limit in ﬁnite time — still, learning grinds to a halt.
As an illustration of the working of the dynamic model, consider the case where two
experts (i = A and B) decide in sequence. Each manager i receives a signal si, inde-
pendent conditionally on the state x and distributed according to (5.1) with binary state
X = {−1,1}. The initial prior on the state is qA = Pr(x = 1) = 1/2, so that the prior ex-
pectation on state is Ex = 0 and the prior expectation on abilities are EtA = EtB = 1/2.
It follows from the analysis of the one-period problem that in the (unique most-informative
equilibrium) the ﬁrst agent A reports the high message mA = [0,1] when observing
s ∈ [0,1] and the low message mA = [−1,0] when observing s ∈ [−1,0]. With condi-
tional independent signals, the equilibrium for the second agent B depends exclusively on
the posterior belief on the state after observation of agent A’s behavior. For example, B’s
prior belief on the state upon observation of message [0,1] sent by A is
q
B = Pr
￿
x = 1|m
A = [0,1]
￿
=
Pr
￿
mA = [0,1]|x = 1
￿
Pr(x = 1)
Pr(mA = [0,1])
=
1
2
+
EtB
4
= .625.
24See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000) on the connection between statistical with reputational herding
models.
18The equilibrium for the second agent is then determined by Figure 3. The second agent
herds since qB = .625 > ¯ q = .5069 for EtB = 1/2. When agent A sends a high message, so
does agent B. Similarly, when A sends the low message, B also sends a low message. We
can conclude that the fact that diﬀerential conditional correlation is necessary to obtain
herding is not a robust ﬁnding of the binary signal model, even when Scharfstein and
Stein’s (2000) strong deﬁnition is used: here “B always ignores his own information and
follows agent A” under conditional independence.25
5.5. Comparative Statics
We are now ready to address some natural comparative statics questions. Notice that a
signal is more informative about ability the larger is |x|. Similarly, a message — which
consists of a garbling of the signal — is more informative about ability the larger is |x|.
Since the equilibrium strategy may be asymmetric (when s is garbled into m) nothing can
be said a priori on how informative is m about t.
Do Better Reputed Experts Send More Informative Messages? By construction
of the model, ex ante better experts are Blackwell-more informed about x. We now show
by way of example that better experts’ messages need not be Blackwell-more informative
because of the equilibrium garbling of the signal. Take q = .505 in the binary-state illustra-
tion above and consider two experts, the ﬁrst with Et = .49 and the second with Et = .5.
Assume that the informative equilibrium with a threshold nearest to 0 has been selected —
a similar example proves our point for the other informative equilibrium. When message
s ∈ [−1,a] is observed, the posterior belief is
q(x = 1|m = [−1,a]) =
[2 + (a − 1)Et]q
[2 + (a − 1)Et]q + [2 − (a − 1)Et](1 − q)
A similar expression deﬁnes q(x = 1|m = (a,1]). The following is based on numerical
solution of equation (5.5). The expert with Et = .5 has an equilibrium with a = .329
yielding q(x = 1|m = [−1,a]) = .42101 and q(x = 1|m = (a,1]) = .67058. The expert
with Et = .49 has an equilibrium with a = .357 resulting in q(x = 1|m = [−1,a]) = .42617
and q(x = 1|m = (a,1]) = .67072. In a decision problem with two actions and indiﬀerence
at a belief in the interval (.67058,.67072), the expert with Et = .5 is of no value while the
expert with Et = .49 transmits valuable information.
25Note that this conclusion is valid regardless of whether Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990) non-
informativeness condition is satisﬁed or not. The non-informativeness condition is satisﬁed in this example,
but would fail for a slightly diﬀerent prior on the state.
19Are Better Reputed Experts Credible for a Larger Set of Priors? Consider an
expert B with a prior reputation p(t) which is FSD-better than the prior reputation of
expert A. Is B non-herding for a wider set of priors on the state of the world? Above we
have seen that the issue of credibility depends on the prior reputation only through Et,
since it is a question of solving (5.4) with a ∈ (−1,1). We cannot answer this question in
the general case, but the answer is aﬃrmative for the binary-state of the world case. To
see this, note that for any a ∈ (0,1), the right hand side of (5.5) is larger the larger is Et.
How Does the Equilibrium Change with the Prior Beliefs? Departing from the
symmetric case, we can analyze the direction of change for a away from 0 when we skew the
state distribution in the multiplicative linear model. A ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
(FSD) increase of x makes the original high message m0 more attractive than the low
message. In the new equilibrium the threshold of indiﬀerence between the two messages
must therefore change. If the threshold were to decrease, an even larger set of experts
would wish to send the high message m0, so that the indiﬀerence threshold would move
further down. This would make m0 even more attractive in an unstable process which
does not lead to a new equilibrium. In order to re-equilibrate the attractiveness of the two
messages, the threshold must instead move up:
Proposition 10 (Comparative Statics). Departing from a prior q(x) symmetric around
x = 0, a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance increase in q(x) results in a new binary equilib-
rium with a higher threshold of indiﬀerence.
6. Predictions
The equilibrium loss of information typically results in a welfare loss for the decision maker.
Likewise, future employers of the expert are interested in learning as much as possible the
expert’s true ability, and so they would prefer that the signal were not garbled. If the
value function v (t) is linear, the sender’s ex ante expected reputational value of sending
any message proﬁle is equal to its prior value. Therefore, the expert is indiﬀerent in ex-
ante terms between the diﬀerent equilibria. In expectation, no one beneﬁts from the fact
that information transmitted in equilibrium is less precise than the information possessed
by the expert.
For the application of this model to the predictions of professional experts, we need
to discuss how information is communicated. In equilibrium the receiver understands that
signals in a certain interval (s ∈ m) are pooled into the same message by the sender. But
the actual cheap-talk language is using arbitrary messages m which need not live in the
20same space as the signals. Given this arbitrariness, an empirical comparison of the experts’
literal statements with the outcome of the predicted variable x is diﬃcult.
The advice given by the expert is typically used by a decision maker, whose decision can
only rely on the information about the payoﬀ-relevant state x contained in the message.
The decision maker’s beliefs f(x|m) as well as the decision taken on the basis of such belief
are unambiguously determined in equilibrium. The natural language of forecasters dictates
them to communicate this belief (or its mean E[x|m]) or to recommend the corresponding
course of action. Alternatively, under delegation the action taken serves as the message.
Statements in such languages can be easily compared with the realized state.
The resulting belief f(x|m) is unbiased, being derived from Bayesian updating, but it
is less accurate than the forecaster’s private belief f(x|s). If many identical experts with
absolute reputational concerns are polled simultaneously, their forecasts should be very
similar, concentrated on at most two diﬀerent positions. Moreover, if their forecasts were
replicated using their models of the economy, the empirically observed forecasts would
appear very inaccurate, since the replication gives the more informative f(x|s). The
empirical forecast errors would likewise appear excessively correlated.
A direct test of our theory would be based on the regression
x = α0 + α1m + α2y + α3s + ε, (6.1)
where x is the realized state, m the forecast, y any publicly known variable at forecast time,
s the private information of the expert, and ε the forecast error. Unbiasedness requires
that, when y and s are excluded, the remaining coeﬃcients are restricted to α0 = 0 and
α1 = 1. Eﬃciency requires that all information available to the forecaster has no additional
predictive power in the regression, i.e. α2 = α3 = 0. Identifying m with the prediction on
the state E [x|m,y], our reputational cheap talk model predicts unbiasedness and eﬃciency
only with respect to public information α2 = 0. According to our coarseness result, the
message sent is not a suﬃcient statistic for the expert’s private information. Furthermore,
it is easy to show that the MLRP of s,x implies the MLRP of s,x conditional on any
realization m, when s is a Blackwell suﬃcient experiment for m (cf. Ottaviani and Prat
(2001)). Thus our model predicts that α3 > 0. Direct test of this prediction would require
access to the forecaster’s private information, but this is rarely available. Rather than
providing direct tests of reputational cheap talk, most of the existing empirical literature
provides indirect evidence based on extensions of the basic model. These extensions are
investigated in Section 7.26
26For further discussion of the predictions of the theory when applied to strategic forecasting we refer
217. Extensions
In order to derive additional testable predictions, the model is extended to account for
some realistic features of advice. In Section 7.1 we show that communication is coarse also
when the expert has a partial direct concern for forecast accuracy. In Section 7.2 we show
that if instead the evaluator does not observe the state, an expert exclusively concerned
about reputation cannot communicate any information. Section 7.3 shows that when the
expert knows privately her own ability type, it is always possible to sustain a binary
informative equilibrium. In Section 7.4 we investigate whether competition resulting from
relative reputational concerns among advisors can improve communication.
7.1. Mixed Reputational and Statistical Objective
Forecasters are typically motivated at least in part by the accuracy of their forecasts.
Similarly, professionals care not only about their reputation but also about the return of
the decision made on the basis of their advice. The mixed objective model presented here
allows us to investigate whether the coarseness result is robust to the introduction of a
statistical component in the objective function.
In the mixed (M) model,
V
M (m|s) = βV (m|s) − (1 − β)
Z
X
(E[x|m] − x)
2 q(x|s)dx, (7.1)
with weight β assigned to the reputational payoﬀ (2.2) and weight 1 − β to the expected
quadratic loss resulting from deviations of the action taken from the optimal action. The
statistical payoﬀ has the same speciﬁcation as in Gul and Lundholm (1995).
Clearly, for β = 0 the forecaster wishes to make the best statistical prediction, so that
truthtelling results. In this pure statistical model
∂
∂m
E
￿
(E[x|m] − x)
2 |s
￿
= 2(E[x|m] − E[x|s])
∂E[x|m]
∂m
. (7.2)
Once m = s is substituted in (7.2), truthtelling is veriﬁed to be an equilibrium. When
instead there is positive weight on the reputational payoﬀ β > 0, truthtelling cannot be
an equilibrium. This follows immediately from our results in Section 3, as the derivative
of (7.1) is β times the one found in the pure reputational model.
It is simple to verify that ∂2 (E[x|m] − x)
2 /∂E[s|m]∂x < 0 in our multiplicative linear
model. This and (5.3) imply that the mixed model (7.1) satisﬁes the sorting condition.
to our companion paper Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001b). There we develop methods to compare the
predictions of the reputational cheap talk theory to those of the forecasting contest theory.
22The marginal payoﬀ resulting from a message with higher mean increases in the level of
the realized state. We conclude that the partition structure of the equilibrium is robust
to the introduction of statistical payoﬀ. We conjecture that the relative importance of the
statistical objective determines how ﬁne an equilibrium partition can be.
7.2. Interim Model
In our baseline model we have assumed that the evaluator observes the state of the
world. This section considers the case where the evaluator only observes the message
sent by the expert, but does not have access to any additional information on the state
of the world. Still denoting the evaluator’s conjecture of the expert’s mixed strategy
by ˆ µ(m|s), we have ˆ f(m|t) =
R
S ˆ µ(m|s)f(s|t)ds = (1 + E[s|m]tEx) ˆ µ(m)/2, so that
p(t|m) = ˆ f(m|t)p(t)/ ˆ f(m) = (1 + E[s|m]tEx)p(t)/(1 + E[s|m]EtEx). The interim (I)
pure reputational payoﬀ from sending m is
V
I(m) =
Z
T
v(t)p(t|m)dt = E [v (t)] + (E [tv (t)] − E [v (t)]Et)
E[s|m]Ex
1 + E[s|m]EtEx
. (7.3)
In this interim reputation model, the only equilibrium is pooling. The indiﬀerence
condition implies that diﬀerent messages cannot reveal diﬀerent information about t. In
the linear (as well as in the binary) model, no information about t implies no information
about x, so that:
Proposition 11 (Interim Reputation). In the interim reputation model where Ex 6= 0
there is no informative equilibrium, even allowing for mixed strategies.
Exactly like in the partisan model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), in the interim repu-
tation model the receiver’s evaluation action is based exclusively on the message reported
by the sender. Some sorting is necessary in signaling games for messages to be credible.
For any information at all to be possibly communicated in equilibrium, the evaluator must
receive some information about the state in addition to the message sent by the adviser.
This model also relates to Brandenburger and Polak’s (1996) analysis of investment
decisions by privately informed managers who are concerned with current share price.
The current share price in turn reﬂects the information inferred by the stock market
from the manager’s observable investment behavior. Our interim model can be seen as
a continuous-signal reputational-objective analogue of their model. In their binary-signal
model there is no pure-strategy informative equilibrium other than for a degenerate prior
on the state (their Proposition 1), but there is an informative mixed-strategy equilibrium
for a set of non-degenerate priors on the state (Proposition 2). Their mixed strategy
23equilibrium has the property that all messages are equally attractive to the sender. Yet,
their messages convey some information about the state of the world, something impossible
in our reputational context.
We can now revisit the model of Prendergast and Stole (1996), whose prediction of full
separation contrasts with ours. Their full revelation result depends on three crucial as-
sumptions: interim payoﬀs, mixed objective, and delegation. In their model, the manager
(expert) cares both about the reputation about ability and the payoﬀ attained with the
decision taken by herself. They ﬁnd that the equilibrium is fully separating and that the
decision taken is distorted because of the reputational motive. To illustrate this, consider
the mixed interim model with delegation (ID), where
V
ID (m) = βV
I(m) − (1 − β)(m − E[x|s])
2 .
Unlike in Section 7.1 evaluation occurs before x is realized. The manager assigns weight
β to the interim reputational payoﬀ (7.3) which follows the inference made by the market
on the basis of the action taken. Weight 1−β is assigned to the quadratic loss due to the
deviation from the optimal action conditional on all the information available.
We look for a fully separating equilibrium, where the strictly increasing strategy m(s)
is diﬀerentiable. The necessary ﬁrst order condition is the diﬀerential equation k =
(m(s) − E[x|s])(1 + E [t]E [x]s)
2 m0(s), where k = βE [x](E [tv (t)]−E [v (t)]E [t])/2(1−
β). It is easily veriﬁed that
m(s) = E[x|s] +
βE [x](E [tv (t)] − E [v (t)]E [t])
2(1 − β)E [t]
￿
E [x2] − E [x]
2￿ (7.4)
solves the diﬀerential equation. Then, m0 (s) > 0 as assumed, and the second-order con-
dition holds. The term E[x|s] is the expert’s honest prediction of the state of the world,
and the diﬀerence between this and m(s) is a constant bias term. This bias is naturally
stronger the more the expert cares about his reputation, and the farther is E[x] from 0.
Notice the similarity with the equilibrium characterized by Prendergast and Stole in their
normal learning model where the expert knows her own ability.
This fully revealing equilibrium would not survive in a cheap-talk framework where the
action taken by the receiver incorporates all the information revealed by the sender. The
ex-post optimal decision for the receiver would not be compatible with signal-to-signal
incentive compatibility. Interim payoﬀs with cheap talk are
V
IC (m) = βV
I (m) − (1 − β)(E [x|m] − E[x|s])
2 .
24We look for a fully separating equilibrium as above. Since the strategy is invertible (i.e.
fully separating), the prediction cannot be biased, E[x|m] = E[x|s]. Observe then that
∂
∂m
(1 − β)(E[x|m] − E[x|s])
2 = 2(1 − β)(E[x|m] − E[x|s])
∂E[x|m]
∂m
= 0.
When the prediction is unbiased (or the action taken ex-post optimal), the ﬁrst-order eﬀect
on the statistical payoﬀ from changing m is zero. On the other hand, given a truthtelling
strategy it is easy to see that ∂V I/∂m is non-zero. Thus the equilibrium cannot be fully
separating. Partially informative equilibria can be easily constructed.
To summarize, coarseness results in the pure reputational model and truthtelling in
the pure statistical model. The predictions with pure objectives are identical, regardless of
whether delegation or cheap talk is considered. With mixed objectives, cheap talk results
at best in a partially revealing equilibrium (bunching) both in the interim and the ex post
case. Full separation with distortion results instead in the mixed interim delegation model.
7.3. Known Own Ability
In our basic model, the expert receives a signal s which is more informative about ability
than the message m submitted in equilibrium. In non-trivial dynamic extensions, there
would therefore be asymmetric information on ability between the sender and the receivers,
as also argued by Avery and Chevalier (1999). In order to study the robustness of our
results to the addition of private information on own ability, we now investigate the case
in which the expert knows perfectly her own ability type, as ﬁrst done by Trueman (1994).
By adapting Trueman’s analysis, Lemma 4 in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001a) shows that
in a binary model there exists always an informative equilibrium, which often involves
some randomization by the least able of the two types.
When the expert privately knows not only the signal realization s but also her own
ability type t, there cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium whereby both s and t are
communicated truthfully. Otherwise, each expert would want to claim to have the highest
ability. In the dichotomous model (3.1), the posterior on x is
q(x|s,t) =
f(s|x,t)
f(s|t)
q(x) =
tq(s)
tq(s) + (1 − t)h(s)
δx(s) +
(1 − t)h(s)
tq(s) + (1 − t)h(s)
q(x),
so that the proof of Proposition 2 can be adapted to show that there is an equilibrium
in which the signal is communicated truthfully, m(s,t) = s. More generally, truthful
reporting of the signal is incompatible with equilibrium as shown in Section 3 for the
unknown own ability case.
25Consider next the multiplicative linear model (5.1). An expert of ability t who receives
signal s has posterior on the state
q (x|s,t) =
f (s|x,t)
f (s|t)
q (x) =
1 + stx
1 + stEx
q(x). (7.5)
Denote the conjectured strategy of the sender by ˆ µ(m|s,t). Let ˆ f(m|x,t) =
R
S ˆ µ(m|s,t) ˆ f(s|x,t) ds.
Upon observation of message m and state x, the posterior reputation is p(t|m,x) =
ˆ f(m|x,t)p(t)/ ˆ f(m|x). The expected reputational payoﬀ of message m for a sender with
signal s and ability t is
V (m|s,t) ≡
Z
X
Z
T
v(t
0)p(t
0|m,x)dt
0q (x|s,t) dx. (7.6)
Notice that we are assuming that value functions are not ability dependent. This is a
strong assumption, because an expert with private information on her own ability knows
better than the market how her reputation will be updated in later periods. In a full
dynamic model an expert’s prospects of future earnings would then depend on ability.
The problem is one of multi-dimensional signaling. Notice from (7.5) that all signal-
ability type combinations with st = k constant result in the same posterior belief on the
state
q (x|s,t = k/s) =
1 + kx
1 + kEx
q (x). (7.7)
The rectangular hyperbola t = k/s represents such iso-posterior locus in the space S×T =
[−1,1] × [0,1]. See Figure 4 for a map of such iso-posterior curves. Truthful reporting of
iso-posterior curves is impossible, since the curve st = 1 implies that t = 1, and it would
yield the perfect posterior reputation.
s
t
−1 0 1
0.5
1
Figure 4: Iso-posterior curves with k = −1/2, k = −1/5, k = 1/5, and
k = 1/2.
We focus on equilibria where the threshold of indiﬀerence between a message and
another are iso-posterior curves. In a binary equilibrium message m is sent for −1/t ≤
26s ≤ k/t and message m0 is sent for k/t ≤ s ≤ 1/t. In contrast to the case when the expert
does not know her ability, there is an informative equilibrium for any prior belief on the
state.
Proposition 12 (Known Own Ability). When the expert knows her own ability, there
exists always a binary informative equilibrium.
Why is there necessarily an informative equilibrium when the expert knows her own
type? If some message were sent exclusively by the highest possible type, then it would
give the highest possible reputation, regardless of the realized state of the world. More
able experts are more conﬁdent in their prediction of the state of the world. As the prior
belief on the state becomes very skewed, only the strongest types have the self-conﬁdence
required to send a message opposite to the prior. If a suﬃciently small set of good types are
sending the message, they signal that they are good and thereby secure a good minimum
reputation, even when the state of the world turns out against them.27
7.4. Multiple Experts and Relative Reputational Concerns
“a decision was made at the outset of this study not to disclose the sources
of the forecasts evaluated (...) forecasters are rivals or competitors (...) Any
statement bearing on the relative quality of a forecaster’s product could be
used in this competition.” (page 1 in Zarnowitz (1967)).
Can competition between experts aﬀect the amount of information credibly commu-
nicated? For instance, full information revelation results in equilibrium when consult-
ing simultaneously multiple perfectly informed experts in the partisan cheap-talk model
of Crawford and Sobel (1982), as shown by Krishna and Morgan (2000) and Battaglini
(2002). Consider instead multiple professional experts with conditionally independent sig-
nals. If they simultaneously report their messages and care only about their own (absolute)
reputation, the equilibrium is the same as in the single-expert model.28
In our reputational setting it is quite natural to allow for relative performance evalu-
ation. Often, the market rewards those with better reputation more if they are scarcer.
One could expect that in our setting more diﬀerentiation (and perhaps more information
revelation in our model with privately information experts) would result when a concern
27In a simple example (with v (t) = t and p(t) uniform on [0,1]) it can be shown that there is only one
equilibrium within the binary class, in contrast with the typical multiplicity of binary equilibria found in
the case of unknown ability.
28See also Levy (2000) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001a) on issues arising when consulting sequentially
professional experts with absolute reputational concerns.
27for relative reputation is introduced. We now show that this is not the case when rep-
utational preferences have a von Neumann-Morgenstern representation and experts have
conditionally independent signals.
Consider this model where experts i = 1,...,N report simultaneously. With relative
reputational concerns, the von Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀ ui(ti,t−i) to expert i depends
also on the ability of all other experts t−i ≡
￿
t1,...,ti−1,ti+1,...,tN￿
. We maintain the
assumption that ui is increasing in ti, but it might well be decreasing in tj for j 6= i.
We make the natural assumption that the state of the world and the ability types of the
experts are independently distributed. As customary in information economics, we further
assume that the noisy signals of experts are independent conditionally on the state and
ability draws.29
The independence assumptions implies stochastic independence of posterior reputa-
tions of diﬀerent experts updated after the reports and observation of the state of the
world. Moreover, only an expert’s own message (and the state of the world) inﬂuences
the updating of the reputation of that expert. According to the martingale property of
updated Bayesian beliefs, the expected posterior reputations of other experts equal the
prior reputations. Finally, the von Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀ is linear in those beliefs.
Thus we have the next general result:
Theorem 2 (Irrelevance of Relative Reputation). Assume that the experts have von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀs, and that their signals are independent conditionally on
state and ability. In equilibrium of the relative reputation model, expert i behaves as in
the absolute reputation model with increasing value function
v
i(t
i) = Et−i[u
i(t
i,t
−i)]
Notice that this result does not rest on our functional assumptions about f(s|x,t) and
holds even if each expert privately knows her own ability. According to this theorem,
in order to generate new and interesting results a relative reputations model must either
assume that there is correlation of experts’ signals conditionally on the state and abil-
ity draw or give up the von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation. For an investigation of
relative reputational concerns in a binary model with conditionally correlated signals see
Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001). Notice that the von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation is
29Notice that in this way we depart from the route taken by a large part of the reputational herding
literature that assumed better managers to have more correlated signals conditional on the state of the
world since Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
28rather restrictive in this setting. Naturally, the market might instead reward experts on
the basis of a comparison of some summary statistics of their updated reputation.30
In the linear model we can conclude that the equilibrium behavior of each expert
is unaﬀected by the introduction of relative reputation evaluation. This follows from
the special property of the linear model that the equilibrium is invariant to monotonic
transformations of the value function, as seen in equation (4.2).31
Proposition 13 (Equilibrium Equivalence with Relative Reputation). In the mul-
tiplicative linear model with conditional independence across experts, the equilibrium in
the relative reputation model is the same as in the absolute reputation model.
8. Conclusion
Increasing specialization of labor suggests that information should be collected by profes-
sional experts. This paper studies information transmission by a partially-informed expert
who wishes to be perceived as well informed. The evaluator cannot commit but to use
ex post all the available information to assess the expert’s ability and is not allowed to
design contingent monetary rewards. Compared to the partisan expert case, the analysis
is complicated by the necessary presence of simultaneous learning on state and ability. We
have managed to make the problem tractable by imposing more restrictive assumptions
as the analysis proceeded and focusing on special but natural cases.
Our ﬁrst result is that truthtelling/full separation is generally not an equilibrium when
the signal and the state can be cross checked to update beliefs about the expert’s type.
In a putative fully revealing equilibrium, the signal and the realized state are informative
about the expert’s type, giving an incentive to the expert to mis-report the signal in order
to generate a better reputation. In contrast with the canonical model of partisan advice,
truthtelling in a professional setting is possible, but only under non generic conditions.
More precisely, we have shown that if there is some interval of signals that is truthfully re-
ported in equilibrium for an open and dense set of priors over the state and value functions,
then the signal structure must satisfy the very special property of local uninformativeness.
Second, in order to improve our understanding of a professional expert’s incentive to
manipulate the market beliefs we considered the optimal reporting strategy for the expert
if the evaluator wrongly believes that the expert is telling the truth. We have shown that
30For instance, the case in which the expert with highest expected ability receives all the rewards cannot
be modeled with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀs.
31This proposition applies only to the case of initial symmetric information about the expert’s ability.
When the expert has private information about ability, the equilibrium depends instead on the value
function.
29in an important special case, the expert has an incentive to deviate toward the neutral
signal. Intuitively, a more conservative signal is more likely to be close to the realized
state and so results in a more favorable update on ability. When the market evaluates
performance in this naive way, excessive conformism results. This is clearly incompatible
with equilibrium behavior.
Third, the recommendations provided in equilibrium by experts motivated by their
reputation as good forecasters are less accurate than the information they possess. The
exact amount of information that can be credibly conveyed depends on the nature of the
information possessed by the expert. By looking at the case in which the expert receives
a binary signal of varying intensity, we have shown that equilibria can be taken to have a
partition structure, the most informative equilibria are typically multiple and they involve
no more than two messages. When the prior is suﬃciently concentrated on any state,
there is only a pooling equilibrium. These striking results could not be easily foreseen in
a two-signal model, but hold in this natural generalization.
Finally, we have extended the model in a number of ways to investigate how the
results generalize to more realistic environments. We have shown that (i) communication
is also coarse when the expert has a partial direct concern for forecast accuracy, (ii)
an expert exclusively concerned with reputation cannot communicate any information
if the evaluator does not observe the state, and (iii) it is always possible to sustain a
binary informative equilibrium when the expert privately knows her own ability type. We
have also shown that relative reputational concerns are irrelevant if the payoﬀ has a von
Neumann-Morgenstern speciﬁcation and the signals are conditionally independent.
We conclude that while the implicit incentives provided by the market discipline the
expert’s behavior, they also increase the scope for strategic manipulation in the revelation
of a given level of information. It is natural to ask how these problems can be overcome with
optimally designed explicit incentives. A starting point for investigating the interaction
between explicit and implicit incentives is provided by Holmstr¨ om and Ricart i Costa
(1986) for the case in which ability adds instead to the value of the output produced. It
would also be interesting to extend our model to allow the expert to become more informed
by acquiring costly signals. The point of departure would be Osband’s (1989) study of
explicit incentives for truthtelling and information acquisition by forecasters in the absence
of reputational concerns.
30Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Truthtelling in Location Experiment). Since the receiver
anticipates truthtelling, the posterior reputation is p(t|m,x) = p(t)f (m|x,t)/f (m|x) =
p(t)g (m − x|t)/g (m − x). By the location property p(t|m,x) depends only on the dif-
ference m−x, and by symmetry it depends only on |m−x|. By the MLRP, the smaller is
|m−x| the better news for t, i.e. p(t|m,x) is better in the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
sense. For any increasing v we conclude that W(m|x) ≡
R
T v(t)p(t|m,x)dt depends only
on |m − x|, and is a decreasing function of |m − x| ∈ [0,π].
Since q (x) is the uniform distribution, the sender’s posterior belief on x is described
by the p.d.f. q(x|s) = f (s|x)/f (s). By symmetry and unimodality of f (s|x), this distri-
bution of x is symmetric and unimodal around s. Thus, q(x|s) depends only on |x − s|
and is decreasing in |x − s| ∈ [0,π].
We now show that these properties of W and q imply that m = s maximizes V (m|s) =
R
X W(m|x)q(x|s)dx over m, so that truthtelling is optimal. By symmetry, it suﬃces to
consider m ∈ [s,s+π] and prove that V (s|s) ≥ V (m|s). Note that half of the space X is
closer to s than to m, namely the values of x in the interval [(s + m − 2π)/2,(s + m)/2].
We have
V (s|s) − V (m|s) =
Z (s+m)/2
(s+m−2π)/2
[W (s|x) − W (m|x)]q (x|s) dx
+
Z (s+m+2π)/2
(s+m)/2
[W (s|x) − W (m|x)]q (x|s) dx
=
Z (s+m)/2
(s+m−2π)/2
[W (s|x) − W (m|x)]q (x|s) dx
+
Z (s+m)/2
(s+m−2π)/2
[W (s|s+m−x) − W (m|s+m−x)]q (s+m−x|s) dx
=
Z (s+m)/2
(s+m−2π)/2
[W (s|x) − W (m|x)][q (x|s) − q (x|m)] dx
where the ﬁrst equality is by deﬁnition, the second uses the change of variable y = m+s−x
in the second integral, and the last follows from W and q depending on their arguments
only through their distance. Since [(s + m − 2π)/2,(s + m)/2] is the interval of x values
closer to s than m, we have W(s|x) ≥ W (m|x) and q(x|s) ≥ q (x|m). Then the integrand
is always non-negative and so the integral is non-negative, proving V (s|s)−V (m|s) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Truthtelling in Dichotomous Experiment). It is seen
immediately that f(s|x) = (Et)δx(s) + (1 − Et)h(s) and f(s) = (Et)q(s) + (1 − Et)h(s).
31Assuming truthtelling, the posterior reputation is
p(t|m,x) =
f(m|x,t)
f(m|x)
p(t) =
(
tp(t)
Et if x = m
(1−t)p(t)
(1−Et) if x 6= m
The reputation obtained after the realization x = m dominates in the ﬁrst-order stochastic
sense the reputation following x 6= m. The posterior on x is
q(x|s) =
f(s|x)
f(s)
q(x) =
(Et)q(s)
(Et)q(s) + (1 − Et)h(s)
δx(s) +
(1 − Et)h(s)
(Et)q(s) + (1 − Et)h(s)
q(x),
an average between an atom at x = s and the continuous prior q(x).
By sending m = s there is a positive probability that x = m and the reputation will
be favorably updated. If instead m 6= s there is probability zero that x = m, so that
the updating which results is necessarily unfavorable. The sender prefers the chance of a
favorable updating and so truthfully reports m = s. 
Proof of Theorem 1 (No Truthtelling). The set for which truthtelling holds in
an interval is deﬁned by the collection of weak inequalities V (s|s) ≥ V (m|s) for all
m ∈ S,s ∈ I. By continuity of the integrals w.r.t. the prior belief q (.) and value function
v (.), this set is closed. The complement of this set is the set of q,v for which local
truthtelling is impossible and so it is open.
The set is also dense, since from any pair q,v it is possible to ﬁnd another pair q0,v0
arbitrarily close to q,v such that the local truthtelling fails. This is shown analytically by
diﬀerentiating (3.2). We have
Vm(m|s) =
Z
X
Wm(m|x)q(x|s)dx =
Z
X
￿Z
T
v(t)pm(t|m,x)dt
￿
q(x|s)dx,
where
pm (t|m,x) = p(t)
fs (m|x,t)f (m|x) − f (m|x,t)fs (m|x)
[f (m|x)]
2 .
so that
Vm(s|s) =
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)p(t)
fs (s|x,t)f (s|x) − f (s|x,t)fs (s|x)
f (s|x)f (s)
dtq (x) dx.
The identity Vm (s|s) = 0 can be rewritten as
0 =
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)p(t)
fs (s|x,t)f (s|x) − f (s|x,t)fs (s|x)
f (s|x)
dtq (x)dx.
If truthtelling holds for all s ∈ I under local perturbations in q, then for almost all
x ∈ X:
320 =
Z
T
v(t)p(t)
fs (s|x,t)f (s|x) − f (s|x,t)fs (s|x)
f (s|x)
dt.
If truthtelling is further robust against local perturbations in v, then for all s ∈ I and
almost all x ∈ X and almost all t ∈ T:
0 = p(t)
fs (s|x,t)f (s|x) − f (s|x,t)fs (s|x)
f (s|x)
This implies for all s ∈ I and almost all x ∈ X and almost all t ∈ T:
fs (s|x,t)
f (s|x,t)
=
fs (s|x)
f (s|x)
.
This condition states that the ratio fs (s|x,t)/f (s|x,t) does not depend on t. The ratio
fs (s|x,t)/f (s|x,t) is equal to dlog(f (s|x,t))/ds, so through integration it determines
log(f (s|x,t)) up to an additive constant. Thus we can conclude that there exist functions
K (t) and g (s|x) such that at all s ∈ I and almost all x ∈ X and almost all t ∈ T we have
f (s|x,t) = K (t)g (s|x).
The signal is then locally uninformative, in violation of the assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Best Deviation). Observe that any sender who reports
truthfully has expected value Ev:
V (s|s) =
Z
T
v(t)
Z
X
p(t|s,x)q(x|s)dxdt =
Z
T
v(t)p(t|s)dt = Ev(t).
Now, ﬁx s > ˜ s without loss of generality. We argue that the sender with s can proﬁtably
deviate to any signal s0 ∈ (˜ s,s). Reporting s0 gives the expected reputational value
V (s
0|s) =
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)p(t|s
0,x)dtq(x|s)dx
to be compared with the truthtelling value V (s|s). We will argue that V (s0|s) > V (s|s) for
any s0 ∈ (˜ s,s), as this proves the incentive to deviate from s to s0. Since V (s0|s0) = V (s|s),
we can equivalently show V (s0|s) > V (s0|s0).
Our comparison rests on two facts. First, since s > s0, q(x|s) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates q(x|s0). Second, with the signal s0 > ˜ s, the higher is the state of the world, the
more favorable the updated reputation, so that
W (s
0|x) =
Z
T
v(t)p(t|s
0,x)dt
33is an increasing function of x. This follows from Milgrom’s (1981) Proposition 1 because:
x is good news for t when s0 > ˜ s,
p(t0|s0,x0)
p(t|s0,x0)
=
f (s0|x0,t0)
f (s0|x0,t)
p(t0)
p(t)
>
f (s0|x,t0)
f (s0|x,t)
p(t0)
p(t)
=
p(t0|s0,x)
p(t|s0,x)
for t0 > t and x0 > x, as a consequence of Lemma 2 proved below; and v (t) is increasing.
Combining the two facts we reach the desired
V (s
0|s) =
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)p(t|s
0,x)dtq(x|s)dx >
Z
X
Z
T
v(t)p(t|s
0,x)dtq(x|s
0)dx = V (s
0|s
0).
Finally, we show that deviating to any s0 outside the interval (˜ s,s) is not proﬁtable.
First, for s0 ≥ s, the ﬁrst fact is reversed, since s0 is better news than s for x. This in turn
reverses the ﬁnal inequality, making the deviation unattractive. Second, consider s0 ≤ ˜ s.
The second fact above is reversed, as higher x is worse news about ability when s0 ≤ ˜ s.
We can conclude that the best deviation is to some s0 ∈ (˜ s,s). 
In the previous proof we have used the following result:
Lemma 2. Consider the linear model with gsx > 0 and neutral signal ˜ s. Let t0 > t and
x0 > x. Then
f (s|x0,t0)
f (s|x0,t)
>
f (s|x,t0)
f (s|x,t)
(A.1)
for all s > ˜ s.
Proof. Substituting f(s|x,t) = tg(s|x) + (1 − t)h(s), (A.1) is equivalent to
t0g(s|x0) + (1 − t0)h(s)
tg(s|x0) + (1 − t)h(s)
>
t0g(s|x) + (1 − t0)h(s)
tg(s|x) + (1 − t)h(s)
or
(t
0 − t)[g(s|x
0) − g(s|x)] > 0, (A.2)
for t0 > t, x0 > x, and s > ˜ s. Notice that gx (˜ s|x) = 0 for all x and gsx > 0 imply that
gx (s|x) > 0 for s > ˜ s, so that (A.2) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Absolutely No Truthtelling). When the strategy is truth-
telling, E[s|m] = m. Using (5.2), the ﬁrst order condition for truthtelling 0 = Vm (s|s) =
R
X Ws (s|x)f(s|x)q(x)dx reduces to
Z
X
x
(1 + sxEt)
q(x)dx = 0.
34Assume that this equation were to hold at two signals, s0 > s. Subtracting the two
equations yields the contradiction
0 =
Z
X
(s0 − s)x2
(1 + sxEt)(1 + s0xEt)
q(x)dx > 0,
where the strict inequality follows from the integrand being positive for all x. 
Proof of Proposition 5 (Monotonicity). Notice that f(s|x) satisﬁes the MLRP and
W(m0|x) − W(m|x) is increasing in x. It then follows immediately from Proposition 1 of
Milgrom (1981) that
V (m
0|s) − V (m|s) =
Z
X
[W(m
0|x) − W(m|x)]q(x|s)dx
increases in s. 
Proof of Proposition 7 (Partition Size). Suppose that three or more distinct mes-
sages were sent in equilibrium. Proposition 1 shows that there must be at least two
message intervals with a non-empty interior, except if the equilibrium has message inter-
vals [−1,−1],(−1,1),[1,1]. In this very case, there is probability one of observing message
(−1,1), so this is equivalent to a one-message equilibrium. For the remainder of the proof
we can assume that three signal intervals [a,b], [b,c], [c,d] deﬁne equilibrium messages,
with a < b ≤ c < d.
By incentive compatibility and payoﬀ continuity, an individual with signal s = b must
be indiﬀerent between the [a,b] and [b,c] messages, i.e. V ([a,b]|b) = V ([b,c]|b). Using
(4.2), in the multiplicative linear model this condition can be rewritten as
Z
X
ˆ µ([a,b]) ˆ µ([b,c])xf(b|x)
ˆ f([a,b]|x) ˆ f([b,c]|x)
q (x) dx = 0. (A.3)
Indiﬀerence between messages [b,c] and [c,d] at signal c gives an analogous condition,
which subtracted from (A.3) gives
Z
X
"
ˆ µ([a,b])f(b|x)
ˆ f([a,b]|x)
−
ˆ µ([c,d])f(c|x)
ˆ f([c,d]|x)
#
ˆ µ([b,c])x
ˆ f([b,c]|x)
q(x)dx = 0. (A.4)
The integrand factor ˆ µ([b,c])x/ ˆ f([b,c]|x) vanishes at x = 0, the neutral state of the
world where signals are non-informative about type. When x is positive, the term is
positive, and vice versa when x is negative.
35The other integrand factor in (A.4), ˆ µ([a,b])f(b|x)/ ˆ f([a,b]|x)−ˆ µ([c,d])f(c|x)/ ˆ f([c,d]|x)
also vanishes at x = 0 since all signals are equally likely. The MLRP integrates to prove
that it is better news about x to observe signal b than to observe that the signal was in the
range [a,b]. This MLRP means that f(b|x)/ ˆ f([a,b]|x) is increasing in x. Likewise, signal
c is worse news for x than the interval [c,d], and f(c|x)/ ˆ f([c,d]|x) is decreasing in x.
Since both factors in the integrand have the same sign as x, the integrand and therefore
the integral in (A.4) is positive, providing a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 9 (No Informative Equilibrium). Deﬁne
ϕ(a,Et,x) =
x(1 + axEt)
[2 + (a − 1)xEt][2 + (a + 1)xEt]
(A.5)
as the integrand of (5.4). Consider an arbitrary ˜ x ∈ (0,1]. Then for all a ∈ (−1,1),
Et ∈ [0,1], we have ϕ(a,Et, ˜ x) ≥ ˜ x/8 > 0 since 2(1 + a˜ xEt) ≥ 2 + (a − 1) ˜ xEt > 0, and
4 ≥ 2+(a+1)˜ xEt > 0. By continuity, for x close enough to ˜ x, ϕ(a,Et,x) is positive and
bounded away from zero. When the prior on the state is suﬃciently concentrated on ˜ x,
there is no solution to the indiﬀerence equation (5.4), since the left-hand side is positive
for any a. An analogous argument applies to negative states. 
Proof of Proposition 10 (Comparative Statics). First, the left-hand side of (5.4)
decreases with a near a = 0 since its derivative in a evaluated at a = 0 is
Z
X
−x4(Et)3 − 2x3(Et)2
[4 − x2(Et)2]
2 q(x)dx.
Evaluated at the original symmetric distribution of x, this integral is negative, since l(x) =
x3/(4 − x2(Et)2)
2 has the antisymmetry property l(−x) = −l(x).
Second, integrand ϕ(a,Et,x) of (5.4) deﬁned in (A.5) is increasing in x near a = 0,
since its derivative with respect to x computed at a = 0 is (4 + x2(Et)2)/(4 − x2(Et)2) >
0. By Milgrom’s (1981) Proposition 1, a FSD increase in the distribution of x will raise the
LHS of (5.4). By the implicit function theorem, locally there will still be an equilibrium,
and the equilibrating threshold a must increase with this FSD upward shift. When the
prior state-belief is changed in favor of higher states of the world, some experts change
from sending the high message m0 to sending the low message m. Furthermore, since the
derivative of the LHS in a is negative, and since Ex changes to become positive, there
must appear a second binary equilibrium with a threshold closer to 1. 
36Proof of Proposition 11 (Interim Reputation). Any two messages m and m0 sent
with positive probability in equilibrium must give the same payoﬀ, as otherwise the message
with lowest payoﬀ would not be sent. The condition V (m) = V (m0) is equivalent to
E[s|m]Ex = E[s|m0]Ex, and since Ex 6= 0 the messages satisfy E[s|m] = E[s|m0]. Now all
messages sent in equilibrium have the same average signal, and this common average must
be zero, since 0 is the overall average signal. Then no message conveys any information
about t or x. 
Proof of Proposition 12 (Known Own Ability). We establish this result through
two Lemmas.
Lemma 3. There exists a k ∈ (−1,1) such that V (m|s,t = k/s) = V (m0|s,t = k/s) when
m is sent by st ≤ k types and m0 is sent by the others.
Proof. First, we argue that for k suﬃciently close to 1, the sender with st = k prefers
message m0 over m. As k tends to one, the set m0 of (s,t) satisfying st ≥ k shrinks towards
the corner (s,t) = (1,1). So, ˆ µ(m0) tends to zero, while ˆ µ(m) tends to one. Since m tends
towards an uninformative message, we have W(m|x) tending to Ev(t) for all x. For any
ε > 0 there exists a k∗ ∈ (0,1) such that V (m|s,t) < Ev(t) + ε for all k > k∗. Since v is
increasing and the prior distribution of t is not degenerate, there exists some t∗ ∈ (0,1)
with v(t∗) > Ev(t). When k > t∗, message m0 is sent only by types who know t > t∗,
so that V (m0|s,t) > v(t∗). Let ε = (v(t∗) − Ev(t))/2 and choose the k∗ deﬁned above.
When k > maxht∗,k∗i then V (m|s,t) < Ev(t) + ε < v(t∗) < V (m0|s,t). This is true for
all pairs (s,t), and in particular for all those with st = k.
By analogy, when k is suﬃciently close to −1, the sender with st = k prefers message m
over m0. When k changes, we continuously change V (m|s,t = k/s) and V (m0|s,t = k/s).
We know that V (m|s,t = k/s) − V (m0|s,t = k/s) is positive for k near −1 and negative
for k near +1. There must be an intermediate equilibrating k. 
For incentive compatibility, the next argument (similar to Proposition 5) proves that
for ﬁxed deﬁnitions of messages, V (m|s,t) − V (m0|s,t) is monotonic across iso-posterior
curves (we have already observed that it is constant on iso-posterior curves).
Lemma 4. If the receiver believes that m is sent by the st ≤ k types and that m0 is sent
by the others, then V (m0|s,t = l/s) − V (m|s,t = l/s) is increasing in l.
37Proof. We ﬁrst prove that P(t|m,x) increases in x when k ≥ 0, but an analogous
argument works for k < 0. From
ˆ f(m|x,t) =
Z k/t
−1
f(s|x,t)ds =
Z k/t
−1
1 + stx
2
ds =
I1(t) + I2(t)tx
2
,
where
I1(t) =
Z k/t
−1
ds =
(
2 if 0 ≤ t ≤ k
1 + k
t if k ≤ t ≤ 1,
(A.6)
and
I2(t) =
Z k/t
−1
sds =
(
0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ k
1
2(k2
t2 − 1) if k ≤ t ≤ 1,
(A.7)
we have
ˆ f(m|x) =
Z 1
0
ˆ f(m|x,t)p(t)dt =
E [I1(t)] + E [I2(t)t]x
2
.
Then
p(t|m,x) =
I1(t) + I2(t)tx
E [I1(t)] + E [I2(t)t]x
p(t)
and
P(t|m,x) =
E [I1(t) | t0 ≤ t] + E [I2(t)t | t0 ≤ t]x
E [I1(t)] + E [I2(t)t]x
P(t). (A.8)
(A.7) implies that I2 is non-positive and decreasing in t, so that 0 ≥ E [I2(t)t | t0 ≤ t] ≥
E [I2(t)t]. Similarly, I1(t) is positive and decreasing in t so that E [I1(t) | t0 ≤ t] ≥
E [I1(t)] ≥ 0. Then (A.8) shows that P(t|m,x) is increasing in x. It follows that
W(m|x) =
Z
T
v(t)p(t|m
0,x)dt
is decreasing in x, as v(t) is increasing in t. Finally, notice from (7.7) that an increase in
l yields a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance increase in q(x|s,t = l/s), so that in turn this
decreases in l:
V (m|s,t = l/s) =
Z
X
W(m|x)q(x|s,t = l/s)dx.
Similar calculations for message m0 show that P(t|m0,x) is decreasing in x. Arguing
as above, V (m0|s,t = l/s) is then increasing in l. We conclude that V (m0|s,t = l/s) −
V (m|s,t = l/s) is increasing in l. 
38Proof of Theorem 2 (Irrelevance of Relative Reputation). The reputational value
of message mi for expert i with signal realization si is
V
i(m
i|s
i) =
Z
X
W
i ￿
m
i|x
￿
q(x|s
i)dx (A.9)
where
W
i ￿
m
i|x
￿
=
Z
M−i
Z
Ti
Z
T−i
u
i(t
i,t
−i)p(t
−i|m,x)dt
−ip(t
i|m,x)dt
i ˆ f
￿
m
−i|x
￿
dm
−i.
By the assumption of independence of the ability of diﬀerent experts, posterior reputations
are again stochastically independent. In particular, the posterior reputation of an expert is
stochastically independent of the message reported by another expert, p(t−i|mi,m−i,x) =
p(t−i|m−i,x) and p(ti|mi,m−i,x) = p(ti|mi,x), so that
W
i ￿
m
i|x
￿
=
Z
Ti
Z
M−i
Z
T−i
u
i(t
i,t
−i)p(t
−i|m
−i,x)dt
−i ˆ f
￿
m
−i|x
￿
dm
−ip(t
i|m
i,x)dt
i
=
Z
Ti
v
i ￿
t
i,x
￿
p(t
i|m
i,x)dt
i,
where
v
i ￿
t
i,x
￿
=
Z
T−i
u
i(t
i,t
−i)
Z
M−i
p(t
−i|m
−i,x) ˆ f
￿
m
−i|x
￿
dm
−i dt
−i.
The law of iterated expectations gives
Z
M−i
p(t
−i|m
−i,x) ˆ f
￿
m
−i|x
￿
dm
−i = p(t
−i|x) = p(t
−i),
where we also used and the independence of t−i and x. It follows that
v
i ￿
t
i,x
￿
=
Z
T−i
u
i(t
i,t
−i)p(t
−i)dt
−i.
and thus vi (ti,x) = vi (ti) does not depend on x. Furthermore, since ui is increasing in
ti for any t−i, we ﬁnd that vi(ti) is an increasing function of ti. We are thus back to
the original problem with absolute reputational concerns, with the individual objective
function vi(ti) = Et−iui(ti,t−i).
When expert i knows her own type, equation (A.9) becomes
V
i(m
i|s
i,t
i) =
Z
X
W
i ￿
m
i|x
￿
q(x|s
i,t
i)dx
and the rest of the proof goes through as before. 
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